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Summary:
This paper argues that the degree of monetary flexibility a government enjoys does not
only depend on the implemented monetary institutions such as exchange rate arrangements
and central bank independence but also on the economic and financial relationships with
key currency areas. I develop a formal theoretical framework explaining the degree of
monetary independence in open economies under flexible exchange rate regimes by
trading relations and financial integration. The model suggests that a) higher import shares
from the key currency area increase the imported inflation when monetary authorities try to
offset an exogenous shock by cutting back the interest rate while the base country does not
encounter a similar shock, and b) the more cross border assets of a country are
denominated in the base currency the higher the exchange rate effects of interest rate
differences to the interest rate of the key currency area. The presented empirical evidence
largely supports the theoretical predictions.
For helpful comments and support I wish to thank Thomas Plümper, David A. Singer and
Quan Li. In addition, I am very grateful to the Bank for International Settlement for
providing data on currency break downs of banks' cross border assets.
21. Introduction
Few if any observers would doubt that ‘the international economy’ influences a domestic
government’s choice of monetary policy. Too obvious have been the various attempts to
find an monetary regime which on the one hand produces the conditions for a stable
international exchange of goods, services and capital, while on the other hand granting
sufficient monetary policy autonomy to the national policy makers in order to allow
flexible responses to economic shocks.
Yet, scholars working on the international influences of domestic monetary policies hardly
agree on the consequences of integrated capital markets and exchange-rate systems on
monetary policy autonomy. While adherents of the Mundell-Fleming approach typically
argue that in the absence of capital controls, governments face a trade-off between
exchange-rate stability and monetary autonomy. Often, the unholy trinity argument has
been interpreted as if an exchange-rate peg leads to a complete loss of monetary policy
autonomy, while the choice of a flexible exchange-rate system assures full monetary
autonomy to the government (or the independent central bank). The ‘fear of floating’
literature provides a very helpful addition to this simplified dichotomous view of monetary
policy. In its proponent’s view do countries with flexible exchange-rates often not enjoy
full monetary policy autonomy but rather take into account the exchange-rate effects when
making monetary policy choices. Accordingly, most governments prefer a managed
floating to a free floating exchange-rate system.
This paper analyzes the determinants of de facto monetary policy autonomy from the angle
of the fear of floating literature1. In brief, my main argument states that the degree to which
the monetary policy of the key currency determines the monetary policy of other countries
depends on the countries’ trade openness, their trade relations with the key currency area,
and the assets which domestic capital owners hold in the key currency. I thus provide an
explanation for the huge variance to which floating countries actually maintained de facto
monetary policy autonomy.
I start with developing a comprehensive theoretical framework determining the conditions
for the degree of monetary policy autonomy in small open economies maintaining flexible
1 I thereby build on the work of Plümper and Troeger (2006a,b) who show that monetary policy set in the
EMU influences the monetary policy flexibility of governments in outsider countries.
3exchange rate arrangements. I develop a formal political economy model of the monetary
policy choice of governments who are constraint by domestic and international factors.
With respect to national constrains governments have the incentive to counterbalance
exogenous shocks, maximize domestic consumption, and satisfy interest groups. On the
other hand international pressures such as trading relations and integration into
international monetary markets also influence monetary policy decisions.
In line with the fear of floating approach my main argument holds that monetary
authorities under floating exchange rate regimes do only enjoy limited monetary policy
autonomy. However, the degree of monetary independence is conditioned upon the
economic relationships with key currency areas. The more a country imports from the key
currency area and the more cross border assets are denominated in the key currency the
more the domestic monetary policy depends on the policy set in the key currency area. The
reason is that greater economic dependence on the key currency area leads to larger
exchange rate effects of domestic monetary policy diverging from the policy set in the key
currency area. In turn, importing large amounts of goods and services from the key
currency area translates the exchange rate effects of domestic monetary policy into
domestic inflation. Rising inflation, however, reduces domestic consumption leading to
losses in voter support for the incumbent. Following this reasoning, governments in open
economies must care about stable exchange rates to the base currency to avoid importing
inflation and diminishing consumption. Thus, small open economies with close trading
relations to a key currency area are prone to bring their own monetary policy in line with
the interest rate policy issued by the base country. My argumentation partly relies on the
assumption that interest differentials to key currency areas exert real exchange-rate effects
which lead to devaluation of the domestic currency. (Dornbusch 1976, Rogoff 1985,
Shambaugh 2005). This effect is the larger the more goods and services are imported from
the key currency area and the more cross border assets are denominated in the key
currency.
I subject the theoretical predictions of my formal model to a rigorous empirical test. The
empirical findings lend ample support to the main hypotheses that a) countries importing a
large share of their goods and services from the base country follow the monetary policy
choices of the base central bank much closer and b) that the same holds true the more cross
border assets are denominated in the key currency. From this result I can draw the
4conclusion that the degree of monetary flexibility is crucially conditioned on the economic
relations with the key currency area.
I proceed as follows: the next section shortly reviews the relevant literature on the choice
of monetary institutions and monetary policy autonomy. Based on this discussion I develop
a formal theoretical model of monetary flexibility by comparing the closed economy to the
open economy case in section 3. Section 4 tests the theoretical predictions empirically on
monthly data of 38 countries over a period of 25 years (1980-2004) and section 5
concludes.
2. Monetary Policy Autonomy in Open Economies: A Brief Literature
Review
The political economic literature dealing with monetary policy is dominated by the well
known and widely used open economy trilemma. The “fear of floating” literature which
serves as basis for the argument brought forward in this paper can be seen as an extension
to the Mundell-Fleming theorem. The trilemma or unholy trinity argument roots in the
seminal work of Mundell (1961/1962) and Fleming (1962) and states in a nutshell that a
policy maker in an open economy only can achieve two of the three policy goals: open
capital markets, stable exchange rates, and monetary policy flexibility. From this it is often
derived that in a world where capital is mobile authorities under fixed exchange rate
regimes cannot use monetary policy to reach domestic goals but governments maintaining
floating exchange rate arrangements enjoy full monetary policy autonomy. Since in the
political-economic literature the Mundell-Fleming theorem was mainly employed to focus
on fixed exchange rate regimes and their merits the “fear of floating” theory (Calvo and
Reinhart 2002) mainly focuses on monetary policy under flexible exchange rate
arrangements. Proponents argue that in a world with highly integrated capital and product
markets governments cannot or choose not to use monetary policy independently from
base economies even in case they face floating regimes because of credibility issues and
exchange rate pass-through. Since financial integration has become almost perfect in the
last decade and capital mobility is higher than ever governments have to choose between
exchange rate stability and monetary policy autonomy if one follows the reasoning of the
Mundell-Fleming model. Yet, the fact that monetary authorities lose monetary policy
autonomy when pegging the exchange-rate (given absence of capital controls) does not
5mean they enjoy perfect monetary independence under flexible exchange-rate regimes. In
other words: under a fixed exchange-rate system governments are obliged or committed to
defend the exchange-rate, under a flexible exchange-rate regime it might still be rational
for the monetary authority to defend relatively stable exchange-rates.
Both theoretical arguments complement and inform each other but generate quite different
predictions about the monetary flexibility policy makers enjoy in countries under floating
exchange rate arrangements. The open economy trilemma concludes that governments
under flexible exchange rate regimes maintain full monetary policy autonomy since under
a floating regime the supply and demand for the domestic currency against the foreign
currency is determined by the market and there is no need for the central bank to intervene.
Therefore, domestic monetary aggregates are not affected by external flows, and monetary
policy can be pursued independently of monetary policy in other countries (Bernhard, Broz
and Clark 2002). The “fear of floating” theory maintains that even in floating regimes
monetary authorities are not able to use monetary policy to achieve domestic goals since
governments are constraint by foreign currency liabilities and loss of credibility.
In political science research on monetary institutions the traditional view of the open
economy dilemma dominates since this literature mainly focuses on fixed exchange rate
regimes and their consequences. William Bernhard, Lawrence Broz and William Robert
Clark (2002: 695) for example state: “When a nation fixes its currency’s value to that of
another nation, it is, to a large extend, delegating monetary policy to a foreign central bank.
The pegging nation not only forgoes exchange-rate flexibility as a policy tool, it also
subordinates its monetary policy to that of a foreign central bank.” The implicit assumption
that monetary authorities under pegged regimes forsake all monetary autonomy while
governments under flexible regimes enjoy full monetary flexibility underlies a wide range
of research on monetary institutions. In particular, the literature on the choice of exchange
rate arrangements (Rogoff 1985, Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Canavan and Tommasi 1997,
Walsh 1995) and central bank independence (Barro and Gordon 1983, Rogoff 1985,
Neumann 1991) relies on the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming theorem.
Scholars in economics concerned with monetary policy either base their research on the
unholy trinity theory or the “fear of floating” view depending on the focus of their studies.
In line with the open economy approach early economists (Mundell 1961, McKinnon
1962, Kenen 1969) have argued that fixed exchange rate regimes lower the exchange rate
6risk and the transaction costs which can impede international trade and investment. Freely
floating exchange rates therefore create uncertainty about international transactions by
adding a risk premium to the costs of goods and assets traded across borders. Pegging thus
reduces these risks and encourages more trade and investment. However, the flipside of the
augmented stability is the complete loss of monetary policy as a policy instrument. The
traditional economic view on exchange rate choices, thus, hinges on the benefits of
integration. Stable exchange rates moderate the transaction costs of international trade and
therefore foster economic growth (Rose 2000). The literature on optimal currency areas
(Mundell 1961, McKinnon 1962; Kenen 1969, Frankel and Rose 1997, Rogoff 2001;
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro 2002; McKinnon 2004) and currency unions (Alesina/ Barro
2001 and 2002; Tenreyro and Barro 2003) is based on the benefits of intensified trade and
loss of monetary independence arguments. On the one hand, members of currency unions
benefit since a joint currency decreases trading costs induced by exchange rate risks and
hence generates efficiency gains. On the other hand, governments of member states have to
surrender monetary policy autonomy to the union’s central bank and can no longer tailor
their policy to country specific exogenous shocks (Mundell 1963).
In addition, the international institution mainly concerned with monetary and exchange rate
policy the International Monetary Fund (IMF) follows in its policy recommendations the
predictions of the Mundell-Fleming theorem. In the view of most IMF economists only the
adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime fosters economic growth especially in
developing countries since policy makers in a floating regime dispose of the necessary
flexibility to adapt monetary policy to domestic economic needs (Gosh et al. 1996, Fisher
2001). The IMF even provides guidance for developing countries how to manage best the
transition from a pegged regime to a flexible exchange rate arrangement (Ingves 2004). In
an address to the Fraser Institute (Vancouver, Canada) in May 2006 the First Deputy
Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, stated:
“So what did our experience in the 1990s teach us about delivering growth and
prosperity? Several important lessons stand out.
First and foremost is the crucial importance of a flexible exchange rate regime. Fixed
exchange rate regimes pose significant challenges because they mean fiscal and monetary
policies must always be consistent with the exchange rate regime and subordinated to it.
The countries affected by capital account crises were all hampered in their initial
response to trouble by fixed or heavily managed exchange rate regimes.”
7The “fear of floating” theory (Calvo and Reinhart 2002) adds some interesting thoughts to
the dichotomous use of the Mundell-Fleming model since it argues that interest rate policy
other than following the base interest rate generates immediate exchange rate fluctuations
beyond the amount most countries are willing to tolerate. Accordingly, no country enjoys
monetary flexibility and all governments must maintain a tight connection to the interest
rate of the relevant base economy.
Even though scholars in the tradition of the “fear of floating” approach question the
restrictive assumptions of the open economy trilemma they do not elaborate on the factors
determining the extent of the “fear”. The conditions responsible for the degree of monetary
policy autonomy in floating regimes are not analyzed. In this respect the “fear of floating”
literature makes equally strict predictions about monetary flexibility since it asserts that
monetary authorities facing flexible exchange rate arrangements must closely follow the
monetary policy choices of the relevant key currency area.
Empirical tests for the predictions of both theoretical strands are very limited and the
evidence supporting either view is rather mixed.
Borensztein, Zettlmeyer and Philippon (2001) provide limited empirical support for the
traditional view of the Mundell-Fleming model. They focus on some countries with easy
identifiable exchange rate regimes (such as Argentina, Mexico, Hong Kong and Singapore)
and try to identify the response of domestic interest rates to exogenous shocks in world
interest rates. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) test the empirical contents of the
unholy trinity and find strong support for the logic of the trilemma theory by analyzing
data of the inter-war period. They argue that under open capital markets and pegged
exchange rates, the half lives of interest rate deviations can be counted in month, and
interest rate pass-through is very strong whether before or after World War I, or even
today. They conclude that the logic of the trilemma has enduring power. Shambaugh
(2004) seriously compares the two theories, he asserts that even if countries with flexible
exchange rate arrangements are somewhat reluctant to use monetary policy due to reasons
the “fear of floating” literature proclaims, the open economy trilemma still holds because
countries with fixed exchange rates enjoy much less monetary flexibility. Shambaugh
shows how pegged countries follow the interest rate of the key currency area more closely
than non-pegged countries and that there exist significant differences to countries with
8flexible exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, the monetary authorities of pegged countries
react more quickly to changes in the key currency area’s monetary policy (ibid. p. 344).
This implies that the non-pegged countries have significantly more room for using
monetary policy for domestic reasons than countries under fixed regimes.
With respect to the claims of the “fear of floating” approach Calvo and Reinhard provide
only anecdotic evidence for developing countries supporting their theoretical predictions.
Frankel (1999) and Hausmann et al. (1999) report some empirical results for selected
countries during the 1990s supporting the “fear of floating” reasoning. The most
convincing findings supporting the view of “fear of floating” are provided by Frankel,
Schmukler and Sevén (2002) who examine whether the choice of the exchange rate system
affects the sensitivity of local interest rates to international interest rates. To test this
assertion they use a quite large sample of developing and industrialized countries during
the period between 1970 and 1999. Frankel et al. empirically show that all exchange rate
arrangements exhibit high sensitivity of local interest rates to international ones in the
1990s supporting the claims of the “fear of floating” literature. The speed of adjustment is
in the long run lower for floating than for pegged regimes. Flexible regimes therefore
appear to offer at least some temporary monetary independence. Yet, in most cases they
cannot deny full transmission of international interest rates in the long run even for
countries with floating regimes.
The two approaches on monetary policy make either un-satisfying predictions about
monetary independence or fail to identify the determinants of the degree of monetary
policy autonomy in open economies. Moreover, the empirical evidence for both the
traditional unholy trinity and the extensions provided by the “fear of floating” view is
rather mixed and inconclusive. In the following I go one step further than asking whether
the open economy trilemma holds or not. The exchange rate system is not the only factor
determining monetary flexibility of policy makers. Hence, the next section provides a
formal theoretical model of the determinants of monetary policy autonomy in open
economies with (more or less) flexible exchange rate arrangements.
3. The Political Economy of Monetary Independence
In what follows I give up the dichotomous treatment of monetary policy autonomy
suggested by the open economy trilemma. In line with Calvo and Reinhart (2002) I argue
9that countries under flexible regimes do not enjoy full monetary policy autonomy.
However, these countries follow the monetary policy of those key currency countries from
which they import the largest part of their goods and services and in which currency most
of the cross border assets are denominated. My argumentation builds on work of Plümper
and Troeger (2006a,b) who examine how the foundation of the European Monetary Union
impacts monetary policy flexibility of countries which did not join the Union. The
theoretical argument is partly based on McKinnon's (1963) argument that small open
economies with flexible exchange rate arrangements have only limited monetary flexibility
due to the fact that interest rate differentials to the relevant key currency area have real
exchange-rate effects. Accordingly, cutting back the interest rate for achieving domestic
goals would lead to a devaluation of the domestic currency and accordingly to imported
inflation. I will show that this effect is the larger the more goods and services are imported
from the key currency area and the more domestic cross border assets are denominated in
the key currency. The trade argument builds upon the Optimal Currency Area (OCA)
theory (see Alesina and Barro 2001 and 2002, Mundell 1961, Frankel and Rose 1997,
Rogoff 2001, Alesina/ Barro and Tenreyro 2002, McKinnon 2004) stating that a common
currency reduces hedging and exchange rate risks. In accordance, countries with a joint
currency benefit largely from intensified trade. In some contrast to the OCA literature and
the “fear of floating” literature I develop a model explaining monetary policy choices of
governments who are constraint by efforts to satisfy domestic voters on the one hand and
international consequences of domestic policy choices on the other hand. The formal
model developed in this section generates predictions about the factors defining the level
of monetary policy autonomy in open economies under floating exchange rate regimes.
The Model
I develop the formal model in two steps. In the first stage I describe the basic settings and
assumptions of the model and the optimal monetary policy choice of a government in a
closed economy. I adopt a standard textbook version of a rational expectations model of
monetary policy with non-partisan governments as it has been suggested by several authors
in the late 1980s (Cukierman/ Meltzer 1986; Rogoff/ Sibert 1988; Persson/ Tabellini
1996). I do not, however, incorporate the idea of governments signalling competence to the
voters by manipulating the business cycle. Instead, I follow Persson and Tabellini (2002)
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and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) in assuming monetary policy to be a political instrument,
which may offset the impact of economic shocks to consumption.
In a second step, I allow for capital flows, exchange-rate effects and trading relations. I
find that monetary policy becomes a more costly political instrument if agents can transfer
capital into other currencies, because the devaluation of the domestic currency will lead to
higher prices of imported goods and thus to more inflation. This effect increases with the
ratio between the consumption of imported goods to the consumption of domestic goods.
The model is consistent with the finding that small open economies are less likely to use
monetary policy than large closed economies. Countercyclical monetary policy becomes
less attractive the smaller the domestic economy relative to the key currency area and the
larger the share of imports from the key currency area relative to the size of the domestic
economy and relative to imports from other countries. The exchange rate effect of
monetary policy also becomes stronger with the share of bank cross border assets
denominated in the currency of the base country.
Monetary Policy Decisions in a Closed Economy
Consider a standard political economic model (see Persson/ Tabellini 1996, 2002, Obstfeld
and Rogoff 1996: 648-652) in which governments maximize a support (or minimize a loss)
function. Implicitly, governments are solely interested in maintaining power; they do not
have ideological preferences2. The government’s loss increases with inflation induced
suboptimal consumption and decreases with output growth due to unexpected inflation:
     
2 1/ 2e e
g t t t t t t tL C Y         , (1)
whereby tC denotes actual consumption, t and
e
t are actual and expected inflation
respectively, t stands for an exogenous shock to the economy, and tY denotes the actual
output. The second term of equation 1 accounts for government’s exploitation of the
Phillips-curve (Phillips 1958). In the short run governments can boost output by
introducing surprise inflation which is actual inflation exceeding the expected inflation (for
a detailed discussion of business cycle theory see Franzese 2002). However in the long run
2 It is nevertheless easy to augment the model by the assumption of party differences. Yet, the basic
conclusions should hold. Moreover, in the empirical part of this paper I also test for partisan differences.
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this opportunistic behavior cannot create output but raises the long-term inflation rate.
Monetarists like Milton Friedman argue that money is neutral – governments cannot boost
consumption and employment by augmenting money supply or lowering central bank
interest rates (Friedman 1968). Friedman claims that wages would have to rise faster than
inflation expectation to make employment more attractive. If wages and inflation increase
at about the same rate, inflating the economy does not lead to more employment. As a
consequence, expansionary monetary policies would raise inflation without altering
employment (Iversen 1999: 19). In addition, Robert Lucas (1972) maintained that voters
do not make systematic errors when predicting the future. Monetary policy would thus be
ineffective even in the short run. Due to this reasoning I will suppress the second term
from equation 1, assuming that on average rational voters expect inflation rates which do
not allow governments to pursue business cycles or at least only on a very short term basis.
Instead I follow the explanation provided by Persson and Tabellini (1996). In their view,
monetary policy has a political value not because governments can manipulate the business
cycle but because higher money supply or reducing interest rates can offset the effects of
economic shocks. In particular, unexpected changes of monetary policy may stimulate the
economy and employment, while expected expansionary monetary policy increases
inflation rather than employment. This possibility is captured by t in the first term of
equation 1. Nevertheless, I will test for the possibility of electoral cycles in the empirical
part of the article.
Following this line of argument the expected inflation then follows:
 1 |e et t E i      (2)
where  denotes the natural rate of unemployment. ei stands for the expected monetary
policy (expected interest rate).
I assume voters to rationally expect the inflation rate so that governments cannot create
output growth by expansionary monetary policy. As a consequence, monetary authorities
have an incentive to set monetary policy according to the non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU) (Mankiw 2001; Ball/ Mankiw 2003). Accordingly, the inflation
target of the government equals the natural output growth. For mathematical tractability
the target rate is set to zero ( 0et  ). This is just a numerical assumption and does not alter
the predictions of the model.
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However, in case there is an unexpected supply shock policy makers may use monetary
policy to counterbalance the shock.
 1t t i       (3)
where i denotes the actual interest rate and  > 0 is a constant describing the degree of
monetary policy pass-through into actual inflation. The degree of pass-through is for
example contingent upon the elasticity of capital markets in their reaction to cuts and
increases in the leading interest rates.
For simplicity reasons I assume that natural unemployment does not change over time. The
actual inflation rate then follows:
 1 1 ; 0tt t t t
t
i i
i

   

   

(4)
In accordance with equation 4 inflation in a closed economy equals a combination of the
inflation encountered in the previous year and the change in monetary policy.
Combining equations 4 and 1 reveals the part of a government’s loss function depending
on its monetary policy choice.
   
2
1 1g t t t t tL C i i       (5)
Inflation is politically costly unless the monetary authority lowers the real interest rate to
offset an exogenous shock to the economy. The first order condition for optimal monetary
policy choices in a closed economy implies:
   1 12 0g t t t t t t
t
L
C C i i
i
    

     

(6)
which results in the optimal policy decision:
, 1 1opt close t t t t t
t
t
C C ii
C
  

   (7)
Equation 7 suggests that the optimal choice of monetary policy for a government in a
closed economy equals the NAIRU, unless there is an exogenous shock to the economy
which can be partly offset by expansive monetary policy in the closed economy case.
When governments do not bring monetary policy in line with exogenous shocks
consumption decreases while inflation remains constant. This is obviously not in the
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interest of the policy maker since it reduces support. On the other hand increasing inflation
to offset an economic shock diminishes consumption as well. The best reaction of the
monetary authority is therefore to only partly counterbalance the exogenous shock by
monetary policy. Thus, the optimal monetary policy stabilizes inflation at acceptable levels
while the unemployment rate approaches its natural rate.
In the next section I abandon the restrictive assumption of a closed economy and allow for
capital flows, trading relations and exchange rate effects. This produces a more realistic
picture of monetary policy choices in open economies and detects the factors that
determine the de facto level of monetary independence.
Monetary Policy, Exogenous Shocks, Trading Relations and Foreign Assets in an Open
Economy:
In an open economy the optimal policy choice not only depends on the degree to which
governments maximize output and consumption by counterbalancing exogenous shocks,
but also on the exchange rate effects of domestic monetary policy settings. In what follows
I show a) that offsetting economic shocks by monetary policy has different consequences
than in the closed economy case, and b) which factors determine the actual level of
monetary independence in open economies with floating exchange rate arrangements.
If a government relaxes monetary discipline while having to deal with an exogenous shock
to the economy, it will not only stimulate the domestic economy but also provide an
incentive for capital exports (which is matched by an increase in the imported goods and
services). Hence, the stimulating effect of ‘cheap money’ is partly absorbed abroad and
this part is larger the smaller the domestic economy is in relation to imports from the rest
of the world. In other words, monetary policy is less efficient in more open economies.
For the sake of the argument it is most convenient to model the inflationary push of lax
monetary policy as a consequence of the exchange-rate effect. This view is consistent with
empirical evidence. For instance, David Romer (1993) finds robust support for the
hypothesis that more open countries tend to have lower inflation rates. The Dornbusch-
model (1976, 1987) associates lower nominal interest rates with depreciation. Dornbusch’s
model predicts that unanticipated monetary expansion by a small open economy will in
general lead to real currency depreciation. Rogoff (1985) shows that the tendency for the
exchange rate to depreciate following a monetary expansion may temper the incentives of
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governments to inflate unless the country’s trade partners inflate at the same time. If the
price index which monetary authorities seek to stabilize includes foreign goods, real
currency depreciation exacerbates the CPI inflation cost of unilateral monetary expansion.
Even though the correlation between nominal interest rates and nominal exchange rates
does not fully support this assertion the Dornbusch model makes strong predictions about
the relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates. Countries adopting
monetary tightening (increasing the interest rate) almost invariably appear to experience
real currency appreciation.3 The empirical results however are mixed (Meese and Rogoff
1983). Yet, the relationship between real interest differentials and real exchange rates
seems to be closer than that between nominal variables (Frankel and Rose 1995, Meese
and Rogoff 1983).4 Shambaugh (2005) finds that import prices move in the same direction
as the nominal exchange rate after monetary shocks. This supports the idea that import
prices tend to be set in the producer’s currency. The import price pass-through is almost
perfect and very high inflation can generate relatively larger import price pass-through.
Based on the fact that the majority of the literature supports the notion of exchange rate
pass-through and monetary policy influencing the exchange rate, I assume monetary policy
to have real exchange rate effects.
The government’s loss function in an open economy changes in the following way:
 
2 /g t t t bL C z E I     (8)
where bz denotes the change of the exchange rate towards the base currency, E and I
stand for total Exports and Imports respectively. The last term of equation 8 captures an
interest group argument brought forward e.g. by Frieden et al. (2001) describing the fact
that exporters rather prefer a weak domestic currency and a higher level of inflation. Since
the interests of a well organized export industry can often be better fed into the political
process than more diffuse consumer interests (Olson 1971) a larger export share of the
economy as compared to the import share should have a significant impact on monetary
policy decisions. However, a depreciation of the domestic currency brought about by
3 Examples include the Volcker deflation of the 1980s in the US, Britain’s monetary tightening under
Margaret Thatcher starting in 1979, the attempts by Italy and France to deflate by pegging to the D-Mark
and in the 1990s several Latin American countries drastically tightened monetary policy after the severe
inflations of the 1980s, with similar effects on the real exchange rates.
4 Because of this finding I will base the empirical analysis on real exchange rates.
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interest rate cuts can stimulate the economy only in the long run. True, a depreciation
makes domestic producers more competitive on foreign markets and foreign producers less
competitive on domestic markets. From a political perspective and in the short run,
however, a depreciation causes a deterioration of the current account because contracts are
long-term and economic subjects and corporations can not respond immediately. Thus, the
political short-term effects of an exchange-rate depreciation are negative: a depreciation
causes a current account deterioration in the short run and an improvement in the long run
– a J-curve effect. Therefore I am only interested in short run effects here and argue that
governments use a rapid and significant exchange-rate depreciation only as ‘policy of last
resort’.
I define the base currency as the currency of the country having most impact on the
domestic economy and the domestic monetary policy. After the breakdown of the gold
standard the US dollar became the main key currency (Aliber 1966). It remained an
important reserve currency since a large volume of international trade transactions is still
denominated in US dollars and foreign official institutions hold large amounts of their
international reserves in liquid dollar assets. However, after the break down of the Breton
Woods System other currencies like the British Pound (for the Common Wealth nations),
the French Franc (for North Africa) and the Deutsche Mark (for European countries)
served as local key currencies. Still, the emergence of the Euro has fundamentally changed
the picture since the formation of the European Monetary Union and especially since it
serves as real means of payments in many European countries (Plümper and Troeger 2006
a and b). The Euro proliferated as the second most important key currency in addition to
the US dollar. This assertion is supported by empirical evidence: The Bank of International
Settlement issues yearly reports on cross border assets of national banks that are hold in
foreign currencies. In this respect the Euro caught up with the dollar in the late 1990s and
early 2000 while other main currencies such as the Yen, the Swiss Franc and the British
Pound only marginally serve as reserve currencies. Assets denominated in Euro exceed
Yen denominated assets by factor 8 in early 2004 and Swiss Franc denominated assets by
factor 21. Over the last decades, a moderate concentration process in international cross-
border assets and a declining role of the Dollar took place. In early 2004, approximately 40
percent of total trans-border assets were held in Euro – up from a historical low of 13
percent in 1984 for the two dominant Euro-zone currencies, D-Mark and French Franc,
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together. The Euro has eroded many of the barriers that segmented the European market
and gave rise to a unified market comparable in size to the one denominated in US dollars.5
Allowing for exchange-rate effects of monetary policy draws the attention back to
inflation, which in open economies depends on domestic monetary policy and on the
exchange-rate. Specifically,
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Y denotes Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and bI are the imports from the base country.
Equation 9 underlines that if the import share from the base country is very large
stabilization of the exchange rate towards the base country is very important since
otherwise the imported inflation might be very large.
The exchange rate to the base currency itself largely depends on the interest rate difference
between domestic interest rate and the base country's interest rate multiplied by the share
of the domestic cross border assets denominated in the base currency:
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Equations 10 and 12 suggest that the change of the exchange rate to the base country not
only depends on the interest rate differential but also on the share of bank cross border
assets denominated in the base currency. This effect is known as size effect of currencies
(McKinnon 1962). It holds that the exchange rate effect towards a certain currency of
monetary policy increases in the share of cross border assets hold in the currency. Assume
an exogenous shock to the domestic economy which the government tries to bolster by
cutting back the interest rate. Decreasing the domestic interest rate induces capital flight
5 This also holds true for the denomination of international contracts in traded goods and the denomination
of bonds, where the Euro outstripped the Dollar already in 1999. For more details, see Galati/ Tsatsaronis
2001; BIS 2004. In accordance with real world developments either the US dollar or the Euro serve as
base currencies in the formal model and especially in the empirical analysis. See also figure 2 for the
development of asset denomination in the countries used for the empirical analysis.
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and causes asset holders to shift their assets denominated in domestic currency to assets
denominated in a reserve currency. As a consequence, the domestic currency depreciates
towards all other currencies but the devaluation is larger against the reserve currency in
which most cross border assets are denominated. Empirical evidence for the size effect can
be easily found: for instance, the currencies of countries most heavily affected by the Asian
crisis, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand (Radalet/ Sachs 1998) lost approximately 80
percent of their pre-crises value against all major currencies, but the drop vis-à-vis the US
dollar was even larger since most cross border assets were hold in US dollars. Accordingly,
the Dollar appreciated vis-à-vis all major reserve currencies (Hausken and Plümper 2002).
The described causal mechanisms underline that the roots of domestic inflation can be
manifold in an open economy and hence this also enhances the complexity of the
government’s decision on the optimal interest rate:
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Equation 13 demonstrates that the exchange rate pass-through of domestic monetary policy
is a function of the interest rate differential to the base country multiplied by the share of
cross border assets hold in the base currency and the imports from the key currency area.
Accordingly, the smaller the domestic interest rate compared to the key currency’s interest
rate, the larger the share of assets hold in the key currency and the larger the share of
imports from the key currency area the higher the domestic inflation.
Inserting equation 12 and 13 into equation 8 gives a more complete picture of the trade off
a government faces in an open economy:
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The decision to offset an exogenous shock now not only depends on domestic settings but
also on the monetary policy set in the relevant key currency area. Especially in case the
shock is asymmetric and only affects the domestic economy. Unilaterally cutting back the
interest rate to contradict the consequences of the shock to the domestic economy can
boost the domestic inflation largely and thereby reduces consumption down to an
undesired level. This unfavorable effect increases with the share of assets denominated in
the key currency and the share of imports from the key currency. A larger share of key
currency denominated assets leads to a stronger depreciation of the domestic currency
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against the main reserve currency whereas more imports from the key currency raise the
domestic inflation rate over-proportionally since all imported goods become more
expensive. Hence it might even be suboptimal to counterbalance an exogenous shock
because the adverse effects of exchange rate pass-through outweigh the positive effects of
stimulating the economy by expansionary monetary policy. On the other hand a dominant
export oriented industry could lobby for a weaker currency towards the main trading
partners. Since specialized interests are often better organized than diffuse consumer
interests (Olson 1971) a strong export oriented industry might be able to put pressure on
the policy makers and enforce more expansionary monetary policy. Domestic policy
making in open economies therefore is faced with divers trade-offs since governments
always have more policy goals than instruments at hand to achieve these domestic goals.
The first order condition for optimal domestic monetary policy then implies:
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solving for the domestic interest rate gives:
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Optimal monetary policy making in open economies is conditioned upon domestic
demands and economic relationships with the relevant key currency. Exogenous shocks to
the economy enhance the incentives for governments to use monetary policy in order to
offset the adverse consequences of this shock for domestic consumption and employment.
In contrast, greater import shares of goods and services coming from the relevant base
country contradict the stimulating effect of cutting back the interest rate because of
imported inflation via exchange rate pass-through of import prices. Moreover, the effect of
isolated domestic monetary economy on the exchange rate to the base country depends on
the share of cross border assets hold in the key currency. As a consequence, the domestic
monetary authority should follow the monetary policy of the key currency area’s central
bank more closely the higher the amount of imports from the base country and the higher
the asset share denominated in the reserve currency.
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Since the expression in equation 16 is very complex I simulate the optimal policy choice in
an open economy for different parameter settings.
Table 1 shows the values for the parameters remaining unchanged in the simulations. The
pass-through variables import shares, export shares, and asset shares are set to medium
values. I assume that the domestic economy faces a current exogenous shock (set to 3) and
the inflation in the previous period exceeds zero (2).
Table 1: Parameter settings for simulations:
Parameter Value
 0.5
tC 1
t 3
1t  2
1ti  4
( I  0.5)
A 0.5
E 0.5
Table 2 depicts the optimal domestic interest rate dependent on the foreign interest rate and
the share of imports coming from the relevant key currency area.
Table 2: optimal domestic policy for different values of the interest rate in the base country
and import share of the key currency area
Import share of the key currency area
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0 1.5 1.4 1.32 1.24 1.17 1.11 1.05 1 0.96 0.91 0.88
0.5 1.5 1.45 1.4 1.36 1.32 1.28 1.24 1.21 1.18 1.15 1.13
1 1.5 1.5 1.49 1.47 1.46 1.44 1.43 1.42 1.4 1.39 1.38
1.5 1.5 1.54 1.57 1.59 1.6 1.61 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.63
2 1.5 1.59 1.65 1.7 1.74 1.78 1.8 1.83 1.85 1.86 1.88
2.5 1.5 1.63 1.74 1.82 1.89 1.94 1.99 2.03 2.07 2.1 2.13
3 1.5 1.68 1.82 1.93 2.03 2.11 2.18 2.24 2.29 2.34 2.38
3.5 1.5 1.72 1.9 2.05 2.17 2.28 2.37 2.44 2.51 2.57 2.63
4 1.5 1.77 1.99 2.17 2.32 2.44 2.55 2.65 2.73 2.81 2.88
4.5 1.5 1.81 2.07 2.28 2.46 2.61 2.74 2.86 2.96 3.05 3.13
Interest
rate
of the
Base
country
5 1.5 1.86 2.15 2.4 2.6 2.78 2.93 3.06 3.18 3.28 3.38
Column 1 indicates the optimal monetary policy for an open economy having no trading
relations with the key currency area for the parameter settings of table 1. Since the country
faces and economic shock it has to cut back the interest rate compared to the previous year
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but not as much as it would have needed to fully offset the shock since the inflation target
is zero and the inflation of the previous period was larger than zero. For an open country
the exchange rate effect of monetary policy is enforced by the share of imports from the
base country. The first thing to observe is that the influence of the foreign interest rate
choice increases in the share of imports. Note that the interest rate of 1.5 (the first column
of table 2) in this case does not reveal the closed economy result but the optimal policy in
an open economy which does not import from the base country but holds assets in the key
currency (asset share = 0.5 see table 1) and has a total export to import relation of 0.5 (see
table 1). This is quite unrealistic but demonstrates that export oriented open countries
pursue ceteris paribus a laxer monetary policy than countries importing largely from a key
currency area. The optimal domestic monetary policy converges to the foreign interest rate
in the amount of goods and services imported from the base country. A larger share of
imports raises the effects of interest rate differentials on the domestic inflation rate via
exchange rate pass-through. The more goods and services are imported from the key
currency area the higher the share of foreign products in the consumption basket
responsible for the domestic inflation rate. If the foreign interest rate falls short of the
domestically optimal interest rate than the domestic interest rate is cut back accordingly
and almost completely with increasing share of imports from the base country (light grey
shaded area). The dark grey shaded area in table 2 shows what happens in case the foreign
interest rate exceeds the domestic optimal interest rate when import share is zero. The
domestic monetary policy converges to the foreign one with greater share of imports from
the key currency area. However, the convergence is less than complete accounting for the
relatively large export share of 0.5 (see table 1). Export oriented industries prefer a weaker
currency and accordingly a more expansionary monetary policy in order to ensure
competitiveness of the exported goods and services on the international markets. The first
conclusion to draw from the theoretical model is that domestic monetary policy autonomy
is conditioned upon trading relations with relevant key currency areas. In particular, a
government follows the interest rate policy of a key currency area more closely the more
the domestic economy is contingent upon imports from the base country.
At this point it is clear that the optimal domestic interest rate depends in addition to
domestic settings on the interest rate difference to the base country, the share of imports
from the relevant key currency area and the total amount of exports relative to imports.
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Figure 1 depicts the same relationship graphically. It presents in three dimensions how the
domestically optimal monetary policy is shaped by foreign influences: in this case the
foreign monetary policy setting depicted by the key currency’s interest rate and the amount
of goods and services imported from the key currency area.
Figure 1: optimal domestic policy for different values of the interest rate in the base
country and import share of the key currency area
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Consequently, the autonomy of the domestic monetary authority is largely constrained by
the trading relations with the relevant base country. Imagine, the domestic economy is
affected by and asymmetric exogenous shock and the government tries to contradict the
negative effects of this shock to domestic consumption and output by cutting back the
domestic interest rate. The base country however does not encounter the same shock and
therefore has no incentive to equally reduce the base interest rate. The increased interest
rate difference between domestic and base country translates into a devaluation of the
domestic currency leading to higher prices of imported goods. As a consequence, the more
the domestic economy imports from the key currency area the higher is the imported
inflation. Hence the expected stimulating effect of the expansionary monetary policy is
largely absorbed abroad and almost fully offset by the imported inflation what in turn
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reduces domestic consumption and economic growth. A domestic government anticipating
these adverse effects of using monetary policy in order to counterbalance an asymmetric
shock will be highly reluctant to augmenting the interest rate difference to the base country
from which large amounts of goods and services are imported. Consequently the
government follows the monetary policy in the base country more closely.
A similar relationship between asset shares denominated in the key currency and
exchange-rate effects of monetary policy can be observed.6 The exchange rate effect of
monetary policy works through the share of banks' cross border assets denominated in the
foreign currency. The influence of the foreign interest rate choice on the domestically
optimal interest rate increases in the share of assets. The more assets are denominated in
the foreign currency the higher the exchange rate effect of interest rate differences. Thus,
unilaterally changing monetary policy has larger effects on the exchange rate to the base
country the more assets are hold in the key currency. Consequently, depreciation of the
domestic currency towards the key currency increases in asset shares and so do real prices
of imported goods. Again, the incentives for governments to stabilize the exchange rate via
the key currency and avoid imported inflation become stronger if the asset share that is
denominated in the key currency is larger.
To sum up: Governments in open economies face dilemmatic policy choices since they
cannot reach different policy goals with one policy instrument. In the present case
monetary policy has at least four effects: First, expansive monetary policy directly reduces
domestic consumption what in turn decreases support for the incumbent. Second, monetary
policy affects the level of the currency through interest rate differences to foreign
countries. Third, this on the one hand leads to depreciation of the domestic currency and
fosters exports. On the other hand it increases the domestic inflation via exchange rate pass
through that is dependent on the amount of imports from the key currency area and the
asset share denominated in the base currency. And fourth, monetary policy can be used to
partly offset economic shocks to the economy. However, the possibility of employing
monetary policy to counterbalance the negative effects of an exogenous shock to the
economy is crucially conditioned upon the economic and financial connections with the
relevant key currency area. A country that imports a lot from the key currency area suffers
from imported inflation and reduced consumption when unilaterally cutting back interest
6 See table A1 and figure A1 in the appendix to this paper.
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rates. Those countries must maintain a stable exchange rate to the key currency and
accordingly have to follow the monetary policy of the base country closely.
From the present model one can derive the following predictions about monetary
independence of open economies under flexible exchange rate regimes:
1. Countries with floating exchange rate systems enjoy only limited monetary policy
autonomy.
2. The impact of the monetary policy of a key currency area is largely dependent on the
relative amount of imported goods and services from this area.
3. The effect of the key currency’s monetary policy is hinges as well on the amount of
assets denominated in the key currency.
In accordance, small open economies largely dependent on trading relations and financial
integration do enjoy only a very limited monetary flexibility even though they maintain
floating exchange rates. In comparison economies with a large domestic market that
depend to a lesser extent on trade and international financial markets should be able to
maintain relatively more monetary policy autonomy.
In the next section I empirically test the predictions of the theoretical model by analysing
monthly interest rates of 38 countries from 1980 to 2004.
4. Empirical Analysis: The Determinants of De Facto Monetary Policy
Autonomy
The theoretical argument presented in the previous section implies that the most important
factors determining the degree of monetary flexibility are the amount of imports of goods
and services from the relevant key currency area as well as the share of domestic cross
border assets denominated in the key currencies. These two variables impact the extent to
which monetary authorities must follow the monetary policy of the base country or
currency area. The larger the share of cross border assets hold in the key currency and the
greater the import share of the economy coming from the base country the less flexible is
the choice of monetary policy and the closer should a domestic policy maker follow the
interest rate policy of the base country’s central bank.
I test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model by analyzing the influence of the
interest rate set by the US Federal Reserve and the interest rate set by the
Bundesbank/European Central Bank on the interest rate policies of 38 countries from
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Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, Latin America and North America. Table 3 shows which
countries are covered:
- table 3 about here -
All of the included countries maintain a (partly) floating exchange rate regime for at least
several years during the period under observation. The empirical analysis only includes
observations where the implemented regime was at least partly flexible.7 Shares of cross
border assets were only available for a sub-sample of 20 of the countries in table 3 (these
countries are marked in bold). This sub-sample is heavily dominated by European
countries. To avoid selection bias, I test propositions 2 and 3 of the previous chapter
separately and therefore run models that include either asset shares or import shares.
It is hardly possible to measure actual monetary policy flexibility without asking monetary
policy makers directly on which factors they base their decisions to raise or cut back
domestic interest rates. In addition, even though I could gather this information from
different monetary authorities the answers would be hardly comparable and what is a more
serious problem the answers would be – with a very high probability – endogenous to the
actual monetary policy decisions. I therefore operationalize monetary policy autonomy by
the degree to which domestic policy makers follow the monetary policy decisions taken in
the two key currency areas.8 As dependent variable I choose the “actual instrument used by
most central banks to impose their policy” (Obstfeld et al. 2004: 3). I use monthly data
from 1980-2004.9 This period seems very much suited to my theoretical question since
many countries moved towards more flexible exchange-rate arrangements in the 1980s.
Due to availability I employ either central bank discount rates or lending rates. Since for
7 Table A2 in the Appendix shows for each country the number of month under flexible and fixed
exchange-rate regime. The choice of countries is purely driven by data availability and the question
whether a floating exchange-rate system was in place for at least parts of the time period under
observation.
8 This obviously introduces some noise into the empirical analysis since I cannot distinguish between the
fact that domestic monetary authorities follow the monetary policy in key currency areas because they are
constraint by import and asset shares, or because they react to the same economic shock etc. However, on
the one hand I expect this noise to be random so that it does not influence the estimation result
systematically. In addition, I can show that governments follow the monetary policy set in key currency
areas more closely the more assets are denominated in the key currency and the more goods and services
are imported from the key currency area.
9 For several variables observations were not available for the whole period under observation.
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the German / European and the US monetary policy both types of central bank rates can be
obtained I can regress lending rates on lending rates and discount rates on discount rates.10
I test the robustness of the results with deposit rates since these are less persistent and show
a higher variation over time, however, the main substantial results are not altered.11 In the
choice of the dependent and the main independent variables I follow recent empirical
research on similar topics (Frankel et al. 2002; Obstfeld et al. 2004, and Shambaugh 2004).
Model Specification:
In contrast to Frankel et al. (2002) and following Shambaugh (2004) I employ differenced
interest rates to avoid spurious regression results. The levels of the interest rates are at least
close to non-stationarity and are trended as other authors (Wu and Zhang 1997) claim and
my own unit root tests reveal.12 Significant results for regressing levels on levels therefore
might just reflect common trends. Granger and Newbold 1974 and Phillips 1986 show that
the use of data with unit roots may generate spurious correlations between two independent
integrated series, and in general, that unit roots cause inference problems for standard
statistical testing. Differencing the data and proceeding with standard estimation
techniques should yield sound empirical results (Banerjee et al. 1997). There is also a
theoretical reason for using differenced data: As mentioned in the theoretical part of this
paper I am interested in the short-term effects of interest rate adjustments since I assume
that domestic monetary authorities react to changes in the key currency's interest rate
relatively quickly to avoid adverse exchange rate effects.
Departing from standard empirical testing of monetary policy transmission I use real
interest rates (nominal interest rate minus inflation rate) instead of nominal interest rates to
eliminate noisy short-term variations in the interest rates. It is plausible to assume that
central bankers are able to control the real interest rate since they can adjust the rates even
on a daily basis if necessary. In addition, central bank interest rates and inflation rates are
highly collinear suggesting that monetary authorities are able to target real interest rates.
10 See Table A3 in the appendix for descriptive statistics of all used variables for all countries.
11 Results can be obtained upon request from the author.
12 I use the Fisher unit root test for unbalanced panel data (Maddala and Wu 1999) which confirms that the
interest rates are integrated and are stationary after first differencing.
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Differencing the data removes serial correlation and non-stationarity. However, the
variance of the real interest rates shows still high persistency and is time dependent. This
autoregressive conditional variance of the dependent variable renders the estimation results
of linear regressions inefficient leading to unreliable point estimates (Plümper and Troeger
2005). To account for this problem I run Panel-GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroskedasticity) models which do not only estimate the usual mean
equation of linear models but also specify a variance equation controlling for time-
dependency of the error variance. One might argue that the variance is not only time
dependent but highly volatile variance is associated with exogenous shocks like the high
inflation periods during the 1980s in Argentina and other Latin American countries. Even
if this was the case, I am not interested in substantial results for the variance equation and
treat the time dependence therefore as mere noise. Controlling for autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity increases the efficiency of the estimation and consequently
improves the reliability of the point estimates (Plümper and Troeger 2007).
Frankel et al. (2002) mainly work with US interest rates as the key currency’s monetary
policy. In the pooled regression they use only the US interest rate even though some
countries may follow a different base interest rate. Since my sample starts in 1980 only two
international base interest rates are reasonable to look at: the US central bank rate and the
German/European interest rate. Both currencies, the Euro and US Dollar are mainly used
as reserve currencies. Figure 2 supports this claim and displays for the countries for which
data on asset share were available the share of cross border assets denominated in US
Dollar, Euro, Japanes Yen, Swiss Frank and British Pound.
- figure 2 about here -
I use the German Bundesbank interest rate from 1980 until December 1998 and the interest
rate set by the European Central Bank thereafter. In January 1999, the EMU countries
fixed their exchange-rate and introduced the Euro. I estimate the impact of the
German/EMU real interest rate changes and the US real interest rate changes to examine
whether different key currencies have different impacts on the monetary policy of other
countries depending on their import shares from these two key currency areas and the
shares of assets denominated in the two key currencies. I test for the 2 main hypotheses
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separately by weighting these two key currency interest rates by either import shares from
the US and the Eurozone or by cross border asset shares denominated in US Dollar and
Euro. I only use time points in which countries had implemented a more or less flexible
exchange rate regime.13 I estimate different models for subpopulations: First, my
theoretical model crucially hinges on the assumption of highly mobile capital which can be
transferred into a reserve currency in case the domestic economy faces an asymmetric
shock.14 I therefore include only countries which have implemented low or no capital
account restrictions.15 Second, my argument is also contingent upon the assumption that
governments or monetary authorities depend on support of the median voter in order to
stay in office. Since this assumption only applies to democratic countries, I exclude non-
democratic countries from the sample.16 I thereby rely on the polity2 variable of the
PolityIV (2005) dataset and only include countries with a score of 8 or higher. In a third
step, I exclude hyperinflation periods from the analysis.
As control variables I include the export-import ratio to test for the prediction that higher
export shares lead to laxer monetary policy in order to devaluate the domestic currency
against foreign currencies and to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic exporting
industry.
Furthermore, I control for several factors found to be significant in the literature. Greater
central bank independence should increase the interest rate since central banks are more
conservative, have a low inflation target, and therefore usually implement more restrictive
monetary policy. The most important empirical result is the often supported inverse
relation ship between CBI and the level of inflation (De Haan and Sturm 1992; Alesina and
Summers 1993, Eijffinger and Schaling 1993). Cargill (1995) argues, however, that this
statistical relationship is not robust and depends on included countries and time-periods as
well as on the model specification. In addition I insert an interaction term between Central
bank independence and the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve and the European
13 To determine whether a country had a flexible exchange rate regime I use the de facto classification by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Countries with a de facto peg are excluded (1 in the crude classification).
Countries which at least implemented a semi-flexible system with crawling or moving bands are included
(2-5 in the crude classification).
14 I am very grateful to Quan Li for pointing this out to me.
15 I use the measure provided by Dennis Quinn (1997) on legal capital account restrictions and include
countries with a value large than 2.
16 Thanks to Thomas Plümper for making me aware of this fact.
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Central Bank. I also test for the impact of capital controls whereby more open countries
should be more vulnerable to changes in the monetary policy of key currencies which is
captured by an interaction effect between capital mobility and the impact of the monetary
policy set in the key currency area.
Since a very large body of the political-economic literature is concerned with electoral
business cycles (see Franzese 2002) and how monetary policy is used to manipulate the
business cycle I include a dummy variable for election dates as an exogenous factor that
controls for possible electoral business cycles. Governments should have higher incentives
to use laxer monetary policy in the year before an election in order to boost demand and
consumption and therefore employment. In addition, the economic conditions of a country
might influence the level of domestic interest rates. Hence, I test for the impact of domestic
GDP growth and domestic unemployment rates. Wealthier countries do much less rely on
monetary policy to improve economic conditions and therefore should implement a more
conservative monetary policy. In contrast countries that face high unemployment and low
growth rates are expected to employ a laxer monetary policy in order to advance the
domestic economy.
Including an evenly weighted spatial lag on the right hand side as well as spatial lags
weighted with the distance between the capitals or the import shares to account for a
general diffusion of monetary policy turned out to be highly insignificant throughout all
model specifications. Since I am analyzing first differenced data where initial conditions
that are likely to differ between countries are already eliminated including fixed effects
does not change the substantial results.
Variables:
As dependent variable I choose real changes of monthly discount or lending rates for 38
(20) countries. The sample spans from 1980-2004.
The main independent variables are real changes of the monthly discount and lending rates
determined by the US Federal Reserve and the German Bundesbank or from 1999 onwards
the European Central Bank. All data on interest rates stem from Global Financial Data Inc.
The trade data is taken from the IMF monthly direction of trade statistics (DoT). Trade
data is available all 38 countries. In contrast to Shambaugh (2004) who uses total trade
share with key currency area I use, in accordance with my theoretical model, the share of
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imports from key currency areas US and EMU as compared to all imports. Table 4
provides an overview over average trade shares by region.
- table 4 about here -
The data on cross-border assets of banks denominated in EURO and US dollar was
provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).17 The BIS reporting countries
only include 20 countries that are relevant to the present analysis.18 Even though I cannot
conclude that these 20 countries constitute a random sample I am confident that the
obtained results present at least a first test for the second main hypotheses derived from the
theoretical model. Table 5 displays cross border asset shares denominated in US Dollar and
Euro by Region. It also breaks the asset shares down for two periods before and after 1999
when the EMU countries fixed their exchange-rate and introduced the Euro. As can be also
concluded from figure 2, the Euro proliferated as second most important reserve currency
and especially capital owners in European countries shifted assets towards this key
currency.
- table 5 about here -
Central Bank Independence is measured in two ways: first I use a measure of legal CBI
from Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti 1992. The measure ranges between 0 and 1, whereby 0
means highly dependent and 1 denotes a highly independent central bank. On the other
hand I am including turnover rates of central bank presidents since turnover rates have
shown to be more appropriate for developing countries. De Haan and Kooi (2000) and
Cukierman, Webb, Neyapti (1992) provide turnover rates. Since both measures are highly
correlated but cover different time spans and countries I combine the two. The measure for
capital mobility was generated by Dennis Quinn (1997) and account for legal capital
account regulations. The measure ranges between 0 and 4, where 0 stands for a high
number of restrictions/ closed capital markets, 4 means no restrictions on capital account/
open capital markets. The two election variables distinguish between legislative and
17 I am so thankful to the members of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department especially to Philippe
Mesny and Swapan-Kumar Pradhan for providing this highly confidential data.
18 These countries are: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
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executive elections and are coded as dummy variables which are 1 in the month of the
election and the 12 month before to test for possible business cycle manipulation of the
interest rate and zero for all other month. The election data are taken from the Beck et al.
(2001) data set (World Bank) for the period from 1980 – 2000 and from
www.Electionguide.de for 2000 – 2005. Economic control variables such as export-import
ratio, inflation rates, GDP growth and unemployment rates are gathered either from Global
Financial Data Inc. or from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
Political scientists often claim that party politics make a difference in monetary policy.
Analyzing a partisan variable within my empirical model, hence, seems reasonable. To do
so, I construct a categorical variable measuring whether the majority of the government in
power is ruled by a left-wing party (1) a centrist party (2) or a right-wing party (3). The
data comes from Keefer's (2005) database of political institutions and the Comparative
Welfare States Data Set (Huber et al. 1997, updated by Brady et al. 2004).
Finally, the classification of the exchange rate system follows the natural classification
system of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that is based on de facto rather than de jure
exchange rate arrangements. There exist several classification schemes in the literature, the
most important classification in addition to the Reinhart-Rogoff scheme which is also
based on de facto arrangements was generated by Levi-Yeati and Sturzenegger (LYS)
(2002). Using the LYS classification, however, wouldn’t be appropriate in the present
analysis for the same reason as in Schambaugh (2004): The LYS system uses intervention
data to classify regimes, e.g. direct intervention in currency markets and changes in
domestic interest rates to ensure that the government is actively managing the exchange
rate. Since the variable under consideration is the domestic interest rate, using an exchange
rate classification based on the interest rate intervention would be endogenous.
The classification scheme focuses on de facto and not on official or legal national
exchange rate systems since more often than not the true underlying monetary system is
radically different from the official categorization. They thus focus on market-determined
dual and/or parallel exchange rates. Another advantage of the re-classification of Reinhard
and Rogoff is that it captures regime changes by month. All previous approaches have used
only annual classifications (see Côté 1994 for a review of the relevant literature).
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Empirical Results: Denomination of Cross Border Assets
In a first step I empirically examine the impact of cross border asset shares denominated in
one of the tow key currencies on the monetary flexibility of a country. Table 6 presents the
estimation results for countries maintaining a flexible exchange rate regime and the 3 sub-
samples. Let me first note that a look at the variance equation of the estimation reveals that
controlling for autoregressive conditional variance is necessary. High frequency data often
suffers from ARCH and not accounting for time dependent variance would violate one of
the Gauss-Markov assumptions of linear models rendering the estimation much less
efficient and the coefficients much less reliable. The inclusion of a lagged error term into
all models, however, is not warranted since after having differenced the data almost no
autocorrelation remains. Controlling for serial correlation and autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity leaves the remaining residuals white noise.
Turning to the mean equation: the lagged level of the real interest rates has a negative
albeit small but significant effect. In error correction models this negative coefficient
ensures that the changes are not explosive once the interest rate crosses a critical threshold
and that the process eventually reaches an equilibrium.
Having a general look at the substantial results (models 1.1 and 1.2) seems to support the
main theoretical claims of the formal model. The monetary policy set by the European
Central Bank has a positive and significant effect on the real interest rate in other countries.
The negative but significant coefficient of the US interest rate seems counterintuitive
though. Recall, however, that the sample for which asset shares are available is dominated
by European countries which are prone to follow the monetary policy set in the EMU more
closely (Plümper and Troeger 2006a,b). Yet, weighting the interest rates of the key
currencies by cross border asset shares denominated in Euro or US Dollar clearly supports
the proposition derived from the formal theoretical model. The more capital is shifted
towards a certain reserve currency the stronger are the exchange-rate effects of interest rate
differentials and the more the domestic currency depreciates towards the key currency if
the monetary authority unilaterally cuts interests rates to counterbalance and asymmetric
exogenous shock. Thus, governments follow the interest policy of a key currency area
closer when large asset shares are dominated in that currency. In line with the proposed
theoretical model and the underpinning assumptions this effect seems to become slightly
stronger if we focus on democratic countries with weak or no capital account restrictions
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(models 1.3 and 1.4). It seems straightforward to conclude that the monetary flexibility of
governments maintaining a floating exchange-rate system is not perfect but partly depends
on the decisions of capital owners in which currency to hold assets.
- table 6 about here –
Analyzing the effect of control variables gives a mixed picture. A strong export sector can
lobby for a laxer monetary policy in order to ensure competitiveness of the domestic
products on the world market (Frieden et al. 2001). This line of argument is mirrored by
the negative significant coefficient for the overall export/import ratio (models 1.2-1.5).
Legislative elections don't seem to exert an impact on monetary policy making – at least
not in the 20 (mostly European) countries in the sample. However, executive elections
appear to have an increasing effect on interest rates. If we believe in simple business cycle
models, we would rather expect that governments implement a laxer monetary policy
shortly before elections in order to boost the economy and decrease unemployment in the
short run. Since increasing the main interest rates is normally associated with recession this
finding might be and artifact of the time period and country sample under observation. If
we exclude periods with high inflation (model 1.5) the coefficient changes the sign and
becomes insignificant, which indicates that the variable executive elections may coincide
with high inflation periods and the need to bring inflation down exerts a much stronger
effect than the incentives for governments to manipulate the political business cycle.
The partisanship of the government affects monetary policy in the expected way: right
wing government prefer a more conservative monetary policy and implement slightly
higher interest rates throughout.
Economic factors such as GDP growth and unemployment impact domestic monetary
policy decisions significantly. The coefficient for economic growth points into the
expected direction suggesting the possibility of counter-cyclical policy setting. Favorable
economic conditions, e.g. greater economic growth, lead to more restrictive monetary
policy (higher interest rates). Yet, a rise in domestic unemployment causes governments to
increase interest rates slightly as shown by the positive significant coefficient. Even though
very small, this effect is counterintuitive since we would expect governments to relax
monetary policy in order to stimulate the economy and decrease unemployment at least in
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the short run. This finding rather lends support to the argument that unemployment creates
an incentive for governments to attract capital by implementing higher interest rates in
order to benefit from the employment effects of additional capital.
Checking for central bank independence also has a rather unexpected effect. The
coefficient is negative and significant throughout all 5 models. Yet, the CBI variable does
not vary much over time and the dependent variable measures changes of real interest
rates. Hence, we only can conclude that countries with more independent central banks
decrease real interest rates more often than countries with dependent central banks. We
cannot draw any conclusions about the levels of the interest rates, though. In interaction
with the key currency's monetary policy setting, however, higher central bank
independence seems to weaken the effects of the US and European interest rates. A highly
independent central bank reduces the influence of foreign interest rate policy because
opportunistic governments are not in charge to decide upon monetary policy. Governments
forsake monetary flexibility to a more conservative central bank to increase credibility and
display commitment to a low inflation target.
Higher capital mobility increases the overall domestic interest rate (models 1.1 – 1.5). High
mobility causes capital owners to react more elastically to higher interest rates abroad
because it is easier for asset holders and investors to shift capital to countries where the
earnings from interests are higher. Policy makers try to keep capital by increasing the
interest rates and decreasing inflation with tighter, more conservative monetary policy.
Interestingly, however, governments do not react to (higher) interest rates in all
(neighboring or other) countries. This assertion is supported by the highly insignificant
spatial lags (not reported). In addition, this confirms the theoretical size bias argument:
asset holders do not only care about interest rates but they prefer larger currencies as
reserve currency. The negative sign of the interaction effect between capital mobility and
the interest rates set in the EMU demonstrates that the higher the capital mobility the
smaller the incentives for domestic governments to follow the monetary policy of the key
currency area. Yet, the interaction effect between capital mobility and US interest rate
changes remains positive and mostly significant. Recall that the coefficient for US real
interest rate changes is negative and that the sample is dominated by European countries.
The negative interactions effects, therefore, suggest that with higher capital mobility
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countries tend to care more about monetary policy even in the less important key currency
area.
Empirical Results: Import Shares
Table 7 displays the estimation results for the size of import shares from the US and the
EMU. Since data on direction of trade is available for all 38 countries, the sample used for
examining the trade hypothesis is much larger and includes African countries, as well as
more Asian and Latin American Countries. I again estimate models for countries with
flexible exchange-rate systems (models 2.1 and 2.2) as well as for sub-samples of
democratic countries implementing low capital account restrictions (models 2.3. and 2.4)
and also exclude hyperinflation periods from the model (model 2.5). Restricting the
sample by these criteria seems to be more important in the second part of the analysis,
since the sample includes several non-democratic countries, as well as more closed
economies and longer periods of hyperinflation – especially in Latin American countries.
The high volatility of the real interest rates in Latin American countries also affects the
variance equation of the GARCH models and renders the ARCH term explosive (see
models 2.1 – 2.4). In model 2.5 I exclude hyperinflation periods which generates a stable
variance equation (the sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients is smaller than 1). The
substantial results for democratic countries maintaining high capital mobility and no
hyperinflation support the theoretical arguments more strongly and validate the underlying
assumptions.
- table 7 about here –
The discussion of the effect of the lagged level of the real interest rate as well as the
interpretation of the coefficients of all control variables remains unchanged as compared to
the models analyzing cross border asset shares in table 6 with one notable exception: the
impact of executive elections in the overall sample seems to support the business cycle
hypotheses. Governments have an incentive to boost economic performance by
implementing a laxer monetary policy right before executive elections.
Substantially the estimation results show that there is no or no coherent direct effect of
monetary policy in the two key currency areas. The coefficients of the real interest rate
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changes in the US and the EMU remain mostly insignificant. Since these coefficients
measure mean effects and the sample analyzed is very heterogeneous this result is not
surprising. I examine different countries at the same time which either lean towards the
EMU or the US. Nevertheless, weighting the changes in the monetary policy of the two
key currencies by import shares from the respective currency area shows a clear positive
and significant effect throughout all models. Thus, the higher the import shares from a
specific key currency area the more important the exchange-rate stability towards this
currency becomes in order to avoid imported inflation. Governments forsake at least some
monetary flexibility in order to keep the domestic interest rate close to the key currency's
interest rate.
The overall findings provide strong empirical evidence for the theoretical argument that
governments who are interested in avoiding imported inflation are willing to adjust the
domestic monetary policy to the interest rate policy of the key currency area from which
they import the largest share of goods and services and in which currency most of the
national banks' cross-border assets are denominated. Import prices have an impact on
domestic inflation via exchange rate pass-through. It is thus reasonable for policy makers
to adjust the domestic interest rate to the interest rate set in the country where most of the
imports come from to avoid increased domestic inflation. Furthermore, the denomination
of cross boarder assets mostly impacts the exchange rate towards the currency most assets
are denominated in. Hence, it is necessary to use monetary policy in order to stabilize the
exchange rate towards this currency.
Countries that maintain a floating regime do not enjoy full monetary policy autonomy but
the flexibility of governments in setting interest rates is contingent upon trading relations
with relevant key currency areas as the denomination of cross border assets. The empirical
results support this theoretical proposition throughout different model specifications.
Monetary policy in open economies follows the interest rate decisions in main reserve
countries the closer the more goods and services are imported from this key currency area
and the more assets are denominated in the respective key currency. This suggests that
governments tend to pursuit the goal of exchange rate stability towards currencies of main
trading partners and are reluctant to use monetary policy to stabilize the domestic economy
while increasing the interest rate differential to main currency areas and thereby inducing
higher inflation.
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5. Conclusion
The level of monetary flexibility a government enjoys does not only depend on the
monetary institutions such as exchange rate arrangement and central bank independence
but also on the economic and financial relationships a country keeps with key currency
areas. The present analysis gives up the dichotomous view of the open economy trilemma
on monetary policy autonomy. In addition, I develop a formal theoretical framework
explaining the degree of monetary independence in open economies under flexible
exchange rate regimes by import shares from base countries and amount of cross border
assets hold in the base currency. The model suggests that a) higher import shares from the
key currency area increase the imported inflation when monetary authorities try to offset
and exogenous shock by cutting back the interest rate while the base country does not
encounter a similar shock, and b) the more cross border assets of a country are
denominated in the base currency the higher the exchange rate effects of interest rate
differences to the interest rate of the base country. Accordingly, exchange rate effects of
monetary policy are the basic assumption of the theoretical argument.
The presented empirical evidence largely supports the theoretical predictions concerning
trading relations and asset shares. Countries that import a significant share of goods and
services from a certain key currency area and/ or denominate a large share of their banking
assets in Euro and US dollar have strong incentives to maintain a stable exchange rate
towards these key currencies. Therefore monetary authorities in countries maintaining
floating exchange rate regimes are not as flexible or choose not to act as flexible as the
widely known and applied open economy trilemma might suggest. They use monetary
policy to stabilize exchange rates rather than exploiting interest rate policy for purely
opportunistic or domestic reasons. At the least governments face a trade off between
utilizing monetary policy in order to stimulate the domestic economy or to stabilize
exchange rates to main currencies.
Consequently, the ability of monetary authorities to base their monetary policy decisions
on the economic state of their country is largely dependent on the extent of monetary
independence. The more open and more integrated in international financial and trading
markets a country is the more vulnerable it becomes towards exchange rate volatility.
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Governments, thus, try to target two policy goals with one policy instrument: stabilizing
the economy by using monetary policy to counterbalance exogenous shocks and
maintaining stable exchange rates to the main trading partners. The degree to which
governments are able to offset shocks to the domestic economy is therefore conditioned on
how much the country is interwoven into international markets and whether the exogenous
shock is symmetric or only affects the domestic economy. Hence, the de facto monetary
policy autonomy of countries not issuing a key currency heavily depends on trading and
financial relationships with key currency areas.
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Table 3: Countries included into the analysis
Africa Asia Europe Latin
America
Oceania North
America
Egypt Hong Kong Austria Argentina Australia Canada
Morocco Indonesia (Belgium) Bolivia New Zealand
South Africa Japan Denmark Brazil
Korea Finland Chile
Malaysia France Colombia
Philippines Greece Mexico
Thailand Iceland Peru
Ireland Uruguay
Italy Venezuela
(Luxembourg)
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United
Kingdom
Luxembourg and Belgium are not part of the analysis since they follow pegged regimes
throughout the period under observation
Table 4: Import shares form the EMU and the US by Region
Share of Imports of Goods and ServicesRegion
EMU US
Europe 0.48 0.07
Latin America 0.17 0.30
Asia 0.16 0.10
Africa 0.10 0.47
Australia and New Zealand 0.34 0.12
Canada 0.07 0.65
Table 5: Cross border asset shares denominated in Euro and US Dollar
Share of cross border
assets
Before 1999 After 1999Region
EURO US$ EURO US$ EURO US$
Europe 0.29 0.40 0.22 0.44 0.48 0.29
Latin America 0.07 0.76 - - 0.07 0.76
Asia 0.07 0.54 0.05 0.50 0.11 0.62
Australia 0.02 0.70 0.02 0.80 0.03 0.53
Canada 0.02 0.80 0.02 0.83 0.02 0.73
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Cross border Asset shares
DV: monthly change of real
CB interest rate
Model 1.1
Flex WKS
Model 1.2
Flex WKS
Model 1.3
+ Capmob.
Model 1.4
+Democ
Model 1.5
- Hyperinfl
Intercept 0.076
(0.119)
0.030
(0.128)
0.027
(0.134)
0.027
(0.134)
0.014
(0.134)
Real CB interest rate (t-1) -0.044***
(0.004)
-0.048***
(0.005)
-0.047***
(0.005)
-0.047***
(0.005)
-0.047***
(0.005)
Δ real interest rate 
GER/EMU
0.353***
(0.098)
0.385***
(0.106)
0.408***
(0.110)
0.408***
(0.110)
0.607***
(0.113)
Δ real interest rate US -0.479*** 
(0.168)
-0.463***
(0.174)
-0.300*
(0.179)
-0.300*
(0.179)
-0.436**
(0.197)
 Δ real interest rate EMU 
weighted with Euro Asset
shares
0.280**
(0.153)
0.352**
(0.156)
0.438***
(0.157)
0.438***
(0.157)
0.282**
(0.150)
Δ real interest rate US 
weighted with USD Asset
shares
0.989***
(0.140)
0.997***
(0.140)
1.032***
(0.141)
1.032***
(0.141)
1.030***
(0.149)
Total exports/ total imports -0.028
(0.085)
-0.066
(0.087)
-0.070
(0.088)
-0.070
(0.088)
-0.042
(0.089)
Legislative elections 0.011
(0.021)
0.009
(0.021)
0.009
(0.021)
0.006
(0.021)
Executive elections 0.211***
(0.042)
0.299***
(0.046)
0.299***
(0.046)
-0.044
(0.107)
Colour of the Government 0.022**
(0.011)
0.021*
(0.011)
0.021*
(0.011)
0.012
(0.011)
GDP Growth 0.012***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.003)
Unemployment 0.007**
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.003)
Capital Mobility (CAP) 0.016
(0.019)
0.028*
(0.018)
0.032*
(0.020)
0.032*
(0.020)
0.024
(0.023)
CAP* Δ real interest rate 
GER/EMU
-0.060
(0.037)
-0.075**
(0.038)
-0.096**
(0.039)
-0.096**
(0.039)
-0.147***
(0.040)
CAP* Δ real interest rate US 0.091** 
(0.042)
0.085**
(0.043)
0.023
(0.046)
0.023
(0.046)
0.055
(0.050)
CBI -0.236***
(0.070)
-0.265***
(0.072)
-0.264***
(0.075)
-0.264***
(0.075)
-0.211***
(0.079)
CBI* Δ real interest rate 
GER/EMU
-0.045
(0.161)
-0.032
(0.161)
0.049
(0.162)
0.049
(0.162)
0.128
(0.157)
CBI* Δ real interest rate US -0.203 
(0.177)
-0.213
(0.179)
-0.092
(0.185)
-0.092
(0.185)
-0.033
(0.185)
MA 1  1t  -0.007(0.025)
0.001
(0.025)
0.004
(0.026)
0.004
(0.026)
0.001
(0.028)
Variance Equation:
ARCH 1  2 1t 0.102***(0.008)
0.099***
(0.008)
0.102***
(0.008)
0.102***
(0.008)
0.096***
(0.009)
GARCH 1  2 1t 0.878***(0.008)
0.880***
(0.008)
0.876***
(0.008)
0.876***
(0.008)
0.861***
(0.012)
N 2573 2573 2489 2489 2230
Wald chi²
(Prob > chi²)
2308.63
(0.000)
2864.13
(0.000)
2592.57
(0.000)
2592.57
(0.000)
2172.66
(0.000)
Log likelihood -2311.896 -2306.169 -2235.719 -2235.719 -1770.298
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.1
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Table 7: Estimation Results for Import shares
DV: monthly change of real
CB interest rate
Model 2.1
Flex WKS
Model 2.2
Flex WKS
Model 2.3
+ Capmob.
Model 2.4
+Democ
Model 2.5
- Hyperinfl
Intercept -0.216***
(0.030)
0.813***
(0.057)
0.264***
(0.099)
0.284***
(0.092)
0.143
(0.106)
Real CB interest rate (t-1) -0.085***
(0.001)
-0.096***
(0.001)
-0.023***
(0.002)
-0.024***
(0.002)
-0.051***
(0.002)
Δ real interest rate 
GER/EMU
0.238***
(0.053)
-0.009
(0.058)
0.053
(0.136)
0.163
(0.111)
0.278**
(0.115)
Δ real interest rate US -0.516*** 
(0.063)
-0.291***
(0.078)
0.036
(0.160)
-0.069
(0.129)
-0.042
(0.145)
 Δ real interest rate EMU 
weighted with Import shares
from the EMU
1.111***
(0.070)
1.601***
(0.089)
0.507***
(0.082)
0.454***
(0.082)
0.719***
(0.080)
Δ real interest rate US 
weighted with Import shares
from the US
0.530***
(0.115)
0.989***
(0.142)
0.364***
(0.135)
0.424***
(0.127)
0.443***
(0.133)
Total exports/ total imports 0.420
(0.430)
-0.076**
(0.037)
-0.202**
(0.070)
-0.225***
(0.064)
-0.133*
(0.074)
Legislative elections 0.105***
(0.014)
0.014
(0.017)
0.002
(0.013)
0.042**
(0.018)
Executive elections -0.219***
(0.028)
-0.051
(0.082)
-0.258***
(0.039)
-0.075
(0.081)
Colour of the Government -0.023***
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.002
(0.008)
0.012
(0.010)
GDP Growth 0.013***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.001)
0.016***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.003)
Unemployment 0.006***
(0.001)
0.003**
(0.001)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.003)
Capital Mobility (CAP) 0.014***
(0.005)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.018
(0.018)
0.008
(0.015)
0.005
(0.018)
CAP* Δ real interest rate 
GER/EMU
-0.048***
(0.013)
0.000
(0.016)
-0.035
(0.043)
-0.102***
(0.035)
-0.097**
(0.039)
CAP* Δ real interest rate US 0.232*** 
(0.015)
0.162***
(0.021)
0.060
(0.047)
0.107***
(0.040)
0.061
(0.045)
CBI -0.424***
(0.038)
-0.872***
(0.063)
-0.248***
(0.059)
-0.146***
(0.057)
-0.157**
(0.067)
CBI* Δ real interest rate 
GER/EMU
-0.789***
(0.103)
-1.142***
(0.115)
0.017
(0.148)
0.331**
(0.137)
-0.169
(0.153)
CBI* Δ real interest rate US -0.461*** 
(0.145)
-0.535***
(0.161)
-0.208
(0.188)
-0.409**
(0.175)
-0.177
(0.187)
MA 1  1t  -0.042***(0.006)
0.076***
(0.009)
0.017
(0.018)
-0.055**
(0.022)
-0.014
(0.017)
Variance Equation:
ARCH 1  2 1t 2.004***(0.018)
1.918***
(0.029)
0.289***
(0.007)
0.519***
(0.014)
0.218***
(0.009)
GARCH 1  2 1t 0.227***(0.001)
0.233***
(0.001)
0.812***
(0.002)
0.637***
(0.007)
0.753***
(0.008)
N 7174 6140 4041 3846 3164
Wald chi²
(Prob > chi²)
46588.24
(0.000)
17711.05
(0.000)
516.54
(0.000)
920.49
(0.000)
862.48
(0.000)
Log likelihood -170066.9 -14502.82 -5900.358 -5209.747 -3335.422
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.1
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Figure 2: Cross border asset shares
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Appendix
Table A1: optimal domestic policy for different values of the interest rate in the base
country and assets denominated in the base currency
Asset share denominated in the base currency
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0 2 1.74 1.53 1.36 1.22 1.11 1.02 0.93 0.86 0.8 0.75
0.5 2 1.78 1.61 1.48 1.37 1.28 1.2 1.14 1.09 1.04 1
1 2 1.83 1.69 1.59 1.51 1.44 1.39 1.35 1.31 1.28 1.25
1.5 2 1.87 1.78 1.71 1.65 1.61 1.58 1.55 1.53 1.51 1.5
2 2 1.92 1.86 1.82 1.8 1.78 1.77 1.76 1.75 1.75 1.75
2.5 2 1.96 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.95 1.96 1.98 1.99 2
3 2 2.01 2.03 2.05 2.08 2.11 2.14 2.17 2.2 2.22 2.25
3.5 2 2.05 2.11 2.17 2.22 2.28 2.33 2.38 2.42 2.46 2.5
4 2 2.1 2.19 2.28 2.37 2.44 2.52 2.58 2.64 2.7 2.75
4.5 2 2.14 2.28 2.4 2.51 2.61 2.7 2.79 2.86 2.93 3
Interest
rate
of the
Base
country
5 2 2.19 2.36 2.51 2.65 2.78 2.89 2.99 3.09 3.17 3.25
Figure A1: optimal domestic policy for different values of the interest rate in the base
country and assets denominated in the base currency
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